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1. INTR~Du~TI~Iv 
Linear programming is concerned with maximizing a linear cost functional 
subject to linear constraints. In the finite problem, the variables belong to an 
n-dimensional Euclidean space; and in the infinite problem, to a function 
space. We will be interested in a certain class of infinite programs called 
continuous linear programs (abbreviated CLP). The term continuous is used 
since the linear functional and constraints are defined by continuous functions. 
We will be concerned with the following question. Under what constraint 
conditions will a CLP and its dual have solutions ? This problem has also 
been studied by Duffin in [I] and Levine and Pomerol in [2], but our main 
contribution is that we provide the foundation for a numerical solution to the 
continuous programming problem. Furthermore, we answer the above 
question by showing that a CLP and its dual can be transformed into a 
symmetric continuous game and analyzed from a game theoretic viewpoint. 
From this viewpoint we prove that under certain consistency requirements 
on the constraint sets of the respective programs, that both programs will 
have solutions. The advantage of this method of analysis is that the solutions 
of these two programs can be found by solving the dynamical model described 
in [5] of the corresponding symmetric continuous game. 
2. THE DEFINITION OF A CONTINUOUS PROGRAM AND 
SOME BASIC RESULTS 
The results of this section are an extension of the standard finite dimen- 
sional theory relating linear programming to game theory. A continuous 
linear program (CLP) is defined to be a fourtuple {X, J&‘, b, c*}. X denotes the 
set of functions underlying the constraint set of the program. It is defined 
to be the set of all functions x(t) mapping [0, l] into R” where each component 
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xi is right continuous on (0, I], nondecreasing, and xi(O) = 0. d is a trans- 
formation mapping X into Cm(O) l] (the space of all continuous functions 
mapping [0, l] into R”) determined by 
where A is a continuous real m x 7t matrix function defined on [0, l] x [0, 11. 
b E Cm[O, l] and c* is a linear functional defined on X and determined by 
s 1 C*(x) = c(t) . dx(t) 0 (2.2) 
where c E Cn[O, 11. c* is called the cost functional. The continuous programming 
problem is to find an x in X which maximizes C*(X) while subject to the con- 
straint 
(dx), (4 < MS), i = l,..., m, (2.3) 
for all s E [0, 11. 
The dual of {X, OQZ, b c*} is defined to be {Y, -&‘, -c, -b*}. Y is defined 
precisely as X except that the range of the functions are now Rm rather than 
R”. &’ is determined by, 
W’Y) (4 = jol A=& 4 W) 
where AT denotes the matrix transpose. Observe that the integration is on the 
first variable rather than the second. c(.) is defined from (2.2) and b*(y) = 
J’: b(t) . dy(t). Note the problem of maximizing -b*(y) is equivalent to 
minimizing b*(y). 
Consider the program {X, -c4, b, c*} and let @ denote the set of all x in X 
satisfying (2.3). The program is said to be consistent if 0 is nonempty, and 
any x in @ is said to be feasible. If there exists an x0 in @ such that 
c*(XO) = sup C*(z) 
0 
(2.5) 
then x0 is called an optimal solution of the program and c*(xo) is called its 
value. The program is said to be unbounded if the right hand side of (2.5) 
is unbounded. Finally, a program is super-consistent if for some x in X and 
all s in [0, 11, 
W’di (4 < h(s), i = l,..., m. (2.6) 
Clearly a super-consistent program is consistent. 
Since we will apply the theory of continuous games to the CLP problem, 
let us briefly review the pertinent definition and results of the theory. 
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First recall that a two player zero sum game can be thought of as a 
triple (d, r, 3’) where d and r are the strategy spaces of the players 1 and 2 
respectively and where .X is the payoff functional defined on d j< r. We 
shall now define a continuous game by defining the strategy spaces and the 
payoff functional. The strategy spaces d and r consist of the set of all Rm and 
R” policy functions. An R” policy function is a function F mapping [0, 1] into 
R” where each Fi is a nondecreasing function which is right continuous on 
(0, l] and has F,(O) = 0 and where cb, Fi(l) = 1. The puyoflfunctional X 
is a bilinear functional which is defined by an m x n matrix function K 
where each Kij E C[[O, I] x [0, I], R] (th e set of all real continuous functions 
defined on [0, I] x [0, 11) in th e o f 11 owing manner. For any XE A, y E r, 
,x(x, y) = j1 dx(s) . j1 IQ, t) dy(t). 
0 0 
The triple {A, r, X}, or equivalently, {A, r, K} is called a continuous game. 
Suppose there exist strategies xx E A, y* E r and a real number v such that 
for all x E A and 
X(x, y*) < v 
for all g E r. Then x* and y* are player 1 and player 2’s optimal strategies 
for the game {A, r, 3-1 and v is the value of the game. It was shown in [5] 
that continuous games always have at least one optimal solution. 
A continuous game is symmetric if its kernel is skew-symmetric (i.e., 
K(x, y) = -KT(y, x)). In other words, the roles of the two players are 
interchangeable. It can be easily shown that these games have value zero. 
3. AN APPLICATION OF THE HAHN-BANACH THEOREM TO THE 
THEORY OF CONTINUOUS GAMES 
Recall that one of the objectives of this paper is to show that relationship 
between continuous games an CLP’s. In order to show this relationship we 
need additional information on the structure of solutions to symmetric 
continuous games. Theorem 3.3 provides the necessary information. How- 
ever, before we prove the theorem, we will need to prove the following two 
lemmas. The first lemma is a weakened version of Farka’s lemma for lqcally 
convex topological vector spaces. 
LEMMA 3.1. Suppose A and B are disjoint convex subsets in a real topological 
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vector space X. If B is a O-vertex cone with an interior point, then there exists a 
continuous nonzero linear functional A on X, such that 
Ax<O<Ay (3.1) 
for every x E A, y E B. 
Proof. Let X be a topological vector space and suppose B C X has an 
interior point. From the geometric version of the Hahn-Banach [2, p. 4171, 
we know there exists a continuous linear functional A and a real constant (Y, 
such that 
for all x E A, y E B. 
Ax<a<Ay (3.2) 
Now assume that B is a O-vertex cone. Then 0 E B, and hence 01 < 0. 
Furthermore suppose there is some y0 in B such that Ay, < 0. Then there is a 
real positive h such that Ahya = My0 < (Y which is a contradiction. Therefore 
Ay 3: 0 for all y in B. The theorem now follows. 
We will also need the following lemma on the representation of linear 
functionals. Let C([O, 11, IP) denote the space of continuous functions 
mapping [0, l] into R” with the usual sup-norm topology. Let M([O, I], R”) 
denote the space of functions g mapping [0, I] into Rn where each gi is 
bounded, nondecreasing, right continuous on (0, 11, and g,(O) = 0. 
LEMMA 3.2. Suppose A is a continuous linear functional on C([O, 11, Rn). 
Suppose also A(f) >, 0 if f E C([O, I], R”) and each fi is nonnegative. Then 
there exists a function g E M([O, I], R”) such that for any f E C([O, 11, R”) 
(3.3) 
The proof of this lemma is a simple generalization of the result for the 
case where n = 1 (see [4, p. 2001). 
We are now prepared to prove the main theorem of this section. 
THEOREM 3.3. Suppose (A, A, K} . zs a symmetric continuous game where 
K has dimension n x n. For any E > 0 let {A, A, KE) be the +erturbation of 
the original game where 
(3.4) 
Here 0 denotes the zero (n - 1) i< (n - 1) matrix and 5 denotes an (n - 1) 
vector with each component ci = E. Then either 
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(a) One of the players in the game {A, A, &) has an optimal strategy 
x E A with its nth components not identically zero, or 
(b) Player 1 in the game {A, A, Kj has optimal strategy x* such that 
gl j;’ K,(s, t) dxi*(s) >0 (3.5) 
for all t in [0, I]. 
Proof. Suppose (A, A, K} is a continuous symmetric game and let 
{A, A, Kf} be an arbitrary c-perturbation. Denote the columns of K and KC 
by Ki and Kjr. Let D be the set of all R1 policy functions. Recall from the 
definition of a policy function at the end of Section 2 that in the case 11 = 1 
a policy function is simply a distribution function on [0, I]. 
Let 
and 
Aj = I/i Kj’(s, t) dy(t) wherey varies over D\ 
0 
(3.6) 
P = {f 1 f E C([O, 11, R”) and eachf, is nonnegative}. (3.7) 
Define B to be the convex cone generated by (UyLi Aj) u P and denote 
A ={fI -fE4. 
First consider the case where A n B is nonempty. Then there exist 
hi>,Oandyj~D,j=1,...,71,andf~P,suchthatforalls~[0,1] 
. 
- j’ Kn% t) &n(t) = f (s) + 5’ b j1 Kj’(s, t) dyj(t), (34 
0 j=l 0 
or 
gl j)W> 4 dh,yj(t) = -f(s) (3.9) 
where An = 1. Let y*(t) = (Cj”=, hjy,(l))-ly(t) where y has components 
X,y, given above. Note that the normalizing factor is nonzero since An = 1. 
It now follows from (3.9) that 
$ j-l Kids, t) h*(t) < o 
for i = I,..., n. Since the value of a symmetric game is zero, y* is an optimal 
strategy for player 1, and hence, the conclusion (a) of the theorem is satis- 
fied. 
Now suppose A n B is empty. Since B has an interior point by Lemma 3.1 
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we know there exists a continuous nonzero linear functional A on 
C([O, I], R”) such that 
Af<O,<& (3.11) 
for allfE A and g E B. Since P is contained in B, (3.11) implies that elf > 0 
for all f in C([O, I], P) h avm nonnegative component functions. It follows ’ g 
from Lemma 3.2 that corresponding to (1 is a function x* E M([O, I], P), 
such that 
(3.12) 
for every f in C([O, 11, R”). Furthermore since (3.11) remains valid if we 
multiply the inequality by a positive constant, we know there exists a .4 
satisfying (3.11) whose corresponding x* has CL, xi*(l) = 1. We will 
assume in the following discussion that A and x* have been so chosen. 
From (3.11) and the definition of A we see that for ally in D, 
1 dx*(s) I,’ - Kn’(s, t) dy(t) < 0 (3.13) 
or 
IO1 dx*w jol &‘(s, t) d.(t) > 0. (3.14) 
Since D includes all single jump step functions, (3.13) is equivalent to the 
inequality 
for all t E [0, 11. Similarly from (3.11) and the definition of B, we have for 
j = I,..., n - 1, 
-fl lo1 G(s, 4 h*(s) 3 0 (3.16) 
for all t E [0, I]. 
Suppose x,*(l) # 0. Since the value of {A, A, Kc) is zero, (3.15) and (3.16) 
imply that x* is an optimal strategy for player 1 with x,* not identically zero. 
Thus conclusion (a) of the theorem is satisfied. 
Now suppose x,*(l) = 0. From (3.15), (3.16) and the definition IQ given 
by (3.4), we see that for all t E [0, l] 
; 5,’ K,&, t) dxi*(s) > 0, j = l,..., n - 1, (3.17) 
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g1 j”l K&, t) dx,*(s) 3 ;I cxjyl) > 0. (3.18) 
The strict inequality in (3.18) f o 11 ows from the fact that x,*( 1) 0 implies 
x;:;xi*(l) = 1. A s b f e ore since the value of the symmetric game {d, d, K} 
is zero and since x* satisfies (3.17) and (3.18), it follows that x* is an optimal 
strategy to the game (d, d, K} for player 1. Thus the conclusion (b) of the 
theorem is satisfied. This completes the proof. 
This result can be extended to the nonsymmetric case by the following 
observation. Suppose the nonsymmetric game {d, d, K} has value ZI. Construct 
the matrix A where aij = J&(t) - v and consider new game (d, d, K} 
which now has value zero. The proof proceeds exactly as in the above theorem. 
4. A METHOD FOR COMPUTING SOLUTIONS TO THE 
CONTINUOUS PROGRAMMING PROBLEM USING CONTINUOUS GAMES 
In Theorem 4.4 we will show how to transform a continuous program and 
its dual into a symmetric continuous game. By appealing to the existence of 
solution to these types of games, the theorem will prove that if the two pro- 
grams are super-consistent, then there exist optimal solutions to both 
programs. In addition to the fundamental game theory result of Section 3, 
we will need the following preliminary lemmas on continuous programming. 
LEMMA 4.1. Suppose {X, &, b, c*} and its dual {Y, -.&I, -c, -b*) are 
consistent: Let x(.) and y(.) be in the constraint sets of the corresponding pro- 
grams. Then 
c*(x) d b*(y). 
Proof. Let @ and @’ be the constraint sets for (X, &‘, b, c*} and its dual 
{Y, -J&, -c, -b*}. Assume they are nonvoid. By the definitions of c* and 
@‘, know that for any x in @ and y in CD’, 
c*(x) = JO1c(t) . dx(t) < .i“ (&“y) (t) . dx(t) 
= .,l dx(t) . [ AI(s,‘t) dy(s). 
(4.1) 
Since AT is the algebraic transpose of A, from (4.1) we observe that 
c*(x) < JI: 4(s) . i* 4, t) dx(t) = j-,’ (=dx) (s) - MS). (4.2) 
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But now it is clear from the definitions of the constraint set @ and b*, that 
c*(x) < Jl: b(s) . dy(4 = b*(y), (4.3) 
for any x E @, y E @‘. 
LEMMA 4.2. Suppose x0(x) and y,,(t) are in the respective constraint sets of 
(X, A, b, c*} and{X, -&‘, -c, -b*}, and that 
c*(xo) = b*(yd (4.4) 
Then x0 and y,, are optimal solutions to the two programs. 
The proof of this lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.1. 
LEMMA 4.3. If a continuous program (X, ,sl, b, c*} is consistent but 
unbounded, then the dual is not consistent. Similarly, if the dual program is 
unbounded, the primal is not consistent. 
Proof. Suppose the primal program is consistent and unbounded but 
that the dual program is consistent. Then by Lemma 4.1 there exists a y0 
in the constraint set of the dual program such that for all x(t) in the constraint 
set of {X, JZZ, b, c*} 
c*(x) < b*(yo). (45) 
But (4.5) implies {X, &, b, c*> is bounded which contradicts our hypothesis. 
We now come to the main result of this paper. Theorem 4.4 not only 
describes a method for obtaining solutions of continuous programs but also 
explains an important relationship between the primal and dual programs. 
THEOREM 4.4. Suppose {X, &‘, b, c*} and its dual {Y, --Me’, -c, -b*} 
are both super-consistent. Then both programs will have solutions x,, , yO re- 
spectively, and moreover 
c*(%) = b*(YJ. (4.6) 
i.e., both programs have the same value. 
Proof. Suppose {X, ~2, b, c*} and (Y, -&‘, -c, -b*} are both super- 
consistent. Then for some x E X, y E Y, there is an E > 0 such that 
~11‘,1 “‘(‘I t, dxj(t) ~ b,(s) - E, 
i = 1,..., m, (4.7) 
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j = l,..., n. (4.8) 
Consider the symmetric game (A, d, K’) whose strategy spaces A consist 
of Rm++ll policy functions and whose kernel K’ is given by, 
[ 
0 4, t) --b(s) + Elm 
K’(s, t) = -AT(t, s) 0 C(S)$EL * 
I 
(4.9) 
b(t)= - El,,T -C(t)= - El,T 0 
Here A(s, t) is the m x n matrix functions, b(s) an m-vector function, and 
c(s) and n-vector function; all of which are defined by the program {X, &, b, 
c*}. 1, is the n-vector of l’s and E is chosen to satisfy (4.7) and (4.8). Let 
{d, d, K} be the c-perturbation of the game {d, d, K’} where again E is 
chosen as above. In other words 
0 A@, t> -b(s) 
K(s, t) = -AT(t, s) 0 4s) . 
I 
(4.10) 
b(t)= -C(t)= 0 
Assume that one of the players in the game (d , d, K} (and since the game 
is symmetric, both of the players) has an optimal strategy z in d with its last 
component function not identically zero. Denote the first n components of 
z(t) by y(t), the next m, by x(t), and the last component by A(t). Since the 
game has value zero, for all s E [0, 1] 
il ):ols,(s,) t &,(t) - h(l) 4) Go7 
i = lp...'m' 
(4.11) 
- gl lo1 A&, S) @i(t) i- h(i) C?(S) < 0, j = *,..., % (4.12) 
and 
(4.13) 
By the definitions of X and the strategy set A and by the assumption that 
X(1) > 0, we know that x,(t) = x(t)/A(l) and y&t) =y(t)/h(l) belong to X. 
(4.11) and (4.12) imply that x0 and y0 are in the constraint sets of {X, &, b, c*} 
and its dual respectively. Furthermore from Lemma 4.1 and (4.13) we 
observe that 
t-*(x,,) = b”(y,). (4.14) 
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It now follows from Lemma 4.2 that x0 and y,, are optimal solutions to the 
primal and dual programs. Moreover (4.6) is satisfied. 
Now suppose that all of the optimal strategies to the game {d, d, K) 
have the last component function h(t) identically zero. Then from Theorem 
3.3 we know that player 1 of the game {d, d, K’) has an optimal strategy 
z(t) =- (y(t), x(t), 0) where 
fJws)dy,(t)30, j=l,..., % 
and 
g1 s,’ (-h(t) + 4 dYi(4 + z1 [ (CM + E) h(t) > 0, (4.17) 
or 
Either the left-hand side of (4.18) is strictly negative or the right-hand side 
is strictly positive. Assume the latter. Since {X, Oaz, b, c*} is super-consistent, 
there exists an x’ E X, such that for all t E [0, I] 
gl s,’ &(t, s) dq’(s) < b,(t) - E, i = l,..., m, (4.19) 
where E is defined as before. Therefore, from (4.15) and (4.19) it follows that 
x’(t) + m(t) belongs to the constraint of {X, &, b - E, (c + c)*} for any 
01 > 0. Since the right-hand side (4.18) is strictly positive, (c + c)* (x’ + owe) 
can be made arbitrarily large by choosing OL large, we conclude that 
{X, -“9, b - E, (c + c)*} is unbounded. But then by Lemma 4.3, {Y, -&“, 
-(c + c), -(b - c)*} is not consistent. However by hypothesis, there 
is a y E Y satisfying (4.8). In other words {Y, -&‘, -(c + E), -(b - l )*} 
is consistent. This is a contradiction. Using a similar argument we get a 
contradiction if we assume the left-hand side of (4.18) is strictly negative. 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
In the proof of Theorem 4.4 we saw that the solutions to a continuous 
program {X, &, b, c*} and its dual can be computed from the symmetric 
continuous game {O, d, K} where K is given by (4.10). It was shown in [53 
409/56/1-8 
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that solutions for {d, d, K) can be found by examining the limiting behavior 
of a functional differential equation whose solution can be found numericall! 
or in some cases in closed form. Thus, we have a numerical procedure for 
solving games. 
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